Unless the U.S. acts rapidly now, China will almost inevitably become the world’s biotechnology superpower. The consequences for the world could be insurmountable. That’s the conclusion of a report, Charting the Future of Biotechnology, just released by the National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology (NSCEB).
To prevent dominance by an acknowledged adversary, the Commission—which was established by the U.S. Congress in the FY 2022 Defense Authorization Act—calls for a two-track strategy that helps American companies innovate more quickly and slows China’s rate of advance. Its point-of-no-return timeline is three years.
“We are about to see decades of breakthrough happen, seemingly, overnight…touching nearly every aspect of our lives—agriculture, industry, energy, defense, and national security,” Michelle Rozo, PhD, molecular biologist and vice chair of NSCEB, said while testifying before the April 8 House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Cyber, Information Technologies, and Innovation. Yet, she continued, “America’s biotechnology strengths are atrophying—dangerously.”
Locked in competition
The repercussions of ceding global biotechnology leadership to China are stark. The United States would become, essentially, a client nation, dependent upon an adversary for biotech-based medicines. But biotechnology also is increasingly crucial in agriculture, mining, and processing of rare earth elements, bioremediation, computing, and national security. Losing the biotech race could slow advances in those sectors.
“The United States is locked in a competition with China that will define the coming century. Biotechnology is the next phase in this competition,” Sen. Todd Young, (R-IN), chair, NSCEB, told the Subcommittee.
To win that competition, the Commission advocates leaning into U.S. strengths “…without tripping over our own shoelaces.”
That means, Rozo elaborated, “simplifying pathways to market, exempting certain products from unnecessary regulation, investing in technology start-ups, and making the government a better customer for biotech products to smooth the market challenges, all while pushing back against China’s brute-force economic tactics.”
Importantly, the Commission stressed, that also means, “ending our own willful blindness to (China’s) biotechnology ambitions.
“We must defend our biotechnology intellectual property and data against Chinese state-sponsored corporate espionage, even if it means rejecting an attractive investments,” the Commission determined. “We must not treat Chinese state-run companies as ordinary competitors in our market, even if it means using more expensive alternatives. China does not have a right to American research—period.”
Top priorities
In making its recommendations, the Commission talked with more than 1,800 stakeholders, reviewed classified and unclassified materials, visited sites throughout the United States, and met with foreign government and technology leaders.
Key strategies include investing at least $15 billion during the next five years and streamlining regulations to promote innovation and attract private investors. Without picking winners, the Commission wants to level the playing field by blunting China’s non-market actions. It also advocates using national security tools to protect America’s biotechnology industrial base.
These six pillars outline the strategy at a granular level.
Pillar 1
Establish a National Biotechnology Coordination Office with a director appointed by the President. This includes an office for global competitive analysis and positions biotechnology as an executive-level priority.
Pillar 2
Mobilize the private sector to scale products. This focuses on simplifying regulations, attracting and scaling capital through an independent investment fund, and providing more consistent demand through advance market commitments and other instruments. It also calls for immediate expensing of R&D expenditures and improving federal small business and tech transfer programs’ abilities to support early-stage research.
More directly related to China, the Commission calls for banning the use of biotech suppliers that are deemed a national security risk, for any companies working with U.S. security agencies or the Department of Health and Human Services. Likewise, public companies using single-supply sources in “countries of concern” must disclose those supply chain vulnerabilities.
It is important, the Commission stressed, to protect critical biotech infrastructure and to “fight back against China’s brute-force economic tactics.” Increasing the nimbleness of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States is critical, alongside investigating Chinese dumping of biotech goods and services.
Pillar 3
Maximize the benefits of biotechnology for defense. There is concern that the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) is overlooking biotechnology-enabled capabilities. The Commission wants to engage with stakeholders to identify ethical military applications of biotechnology, build commercial biomanufacturing facilities, and ensure that American capital does not fund the development of technologies in China that could pose a national threat.
Pillar 4
Out-innovate our strategic competitors. The Commission recommends reviewing and/or developing policies to prevent China from obtaining “bulk and sensitive biological data from the United States.” The United States, it said, must begin treating biological data as geopolitically important. The Commission calls for creating a Web of Biological Data for researchers, and adding Centers for Biotechnology to the National Laboratory system “to support grand research challenges.”
Pillar 5
Build the biotechnology workforce of the future. “The United States currently lacks a bioliterate workforce,” the Commission cautioned. It aims to change that with training for relevant government workers and enhancing biomanufacturing workforce training programs. The goal is to ensure federal agencies have the necessary expertise to deal with emerging biotechnology issues.
Pillar 6
Mobilize the collective strengths of our allies and partners. The Commission calls for coordinating efforts around research, talent, and commercialization with those of like-minded nations.
The cost of inaction
“If the United States fails to act, the future of biotechnology could be catastrophic,” the Commission stressed in its report.
“We have learned the cost of inaction,” Young told the Subcommittee. “We let China catch up to us on semiconductor manufacturing, and allowed the Chinese to take our technology, industry, jobs, and leadership. The CHIPS and Science Act, which many of us here worked on, has helped return America to its position as the leading global hub for chips—but it was not easy, or inexpensive.
“We know from experience how the Chinese economic playbook works: corner the supply chain, then choke it off,” he added.
But economic warfare is only one tool.
“The Commission has every reason to believe that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will weaponize biology,” the report stated, citing the CCP’s use of biotechnology to “identify, track, and control Uyghur Muslims” as well as China’s stated “Military-Civil Fusion strategy” to integrate biotech into its military. Against that goal, and a history of what the Commission calls “nontransparent, nonreciprocal, and coercive behaviors that undermine meaningful engagement on biotechnology,” China’s 400-fold increase in biopharmaceutical R&D spending during the past decade is alarming.
Therefore, “Our Commission’s primary recommendation is that the U.S. government should dedicate significant resources over the next five years to win the biotechnology race,” Young said. Biotechnology must become a holistic field in which the private sector is mobilized “to unleash the power of American innovation.”